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Income Averaging: A Canadian Suggestion
Under a progressive income tax with annual accounting periods,
persons with fluctuating incomes will usually pay more taxes over the
years than those having equal amounts of stable income. To lighten
this burden most countries, including the United States,1 have adopted
some form of income averaging.2 The recent Carter Report of the
Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation suggested a new averaging
device as part of its general reformation of the Canadian tax system:
the "income adjustment account."3 Although the government has de-
cided not to adopt the Report as the foundation for its tax reform,4
the income account idea could be applied in a variety of tax contexts
and deserves more comprehensive treatment than the Report was able
to give.5
The Report proposed that all individual and family tax units be
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05. See generally Goldberg, Income Averaging Under
the Revenue Act of 1964, 74 YALE LJ. 465 (1965); Webster & Reed, Income Averaging and
the 196 Revenue Act, U. So. CAL. 1965 TAx INsr. 407.
2. 3 REPORT OF Tm ROYAL Co. ssssioN ON TAXATION 250-54 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT]. There is a large literature on income averaging; for a summary and a mathe-
matical description of most proposals, see Steger, Averaging Income for Income Tax Pur-
poses in Housn CounL ON WAYS AND AfEANS, 86Tr CONG., 1sr SESS., 1 TAx Rmvision Cot-
PENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE b89 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter
cited as 1959 ComPENDIUM]. See also 1959 CoSIPENDium 579-87, 621-17; W. Vzcunnz
AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 164-97 (1947).
3. 3 REPORT 259-61.
4. The Gazette (Montreal), Dec. 1, 1957, at 6, col. 4.
The Report has recommended major changes in the Canadian tax system. It Calls for
integration of the personal and corporate income taxes, inclusion of gifts and bequests
in taxable income, the use of the family as the basic tax unit, and the application of an
expanded definition of income. Most of these changes have long been part of the standard
canon of tax reform espoused by economists. E.g., H. SIMoNs, PEn oNAL IrcollE TAXATION
(1938). But the central recommendation, the comprehensive tax base, has recently been
severely criticized. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Re-
form, 80 HA~v. L. Rxv. 925 (1967). But see Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept,
81 H.Rv. L. Rxv. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81
HAv. L. REv. 63 (1967).
Business and industry strongly opposed the Report, and this plus the dillculty of fore-
seeing the results of such substantial changes was enough to prevent its enactment. In
lieu of the reforms suggested by the Commission, the government will apparently move
towards a system closer to that of the United States. The Gazette, supra.
5. The only critical discussion of averaging in the Report does not even mention the
income adjustment accounts. Smith, Rates, Allowances and Averaging in CuAxwAN TAX
FOUNDATION, REPORT OF TnE PROCE DINGS OF THE NiNEm Ertr TAx CONFERENCE 241, 25-26
(1967).
6. See 3 REPORT 269, 271, 278-79.
The Report proposes the adoption of the family as the basic tax unit, lumping the
income and deductions of all members together. Separate tax schedules are provided for
unattached individuals and families. 3 REPORT 117-51. Trusts, cooperatives, and corpora-
tions are taxed as separate entities, but the taxes imposed on them are integrated with
the personal income taxes of their beneficiaries. 4 Id. 3-9, 155-64. Use of the accounts is
not explicitly restricted to personal tax units, but the intention to exclude other tax en-
tities i  clear.
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allowed to establish income adjustment accounts by making non-inter.
est-bearing deposits with the government.7 The taxpayer would be able
to deduct deposits from his taxable income in the year of deposit and
would include the deposits in his taxable income upon withdrawal.8
By making deposits in periods of high income and withdrawals in times
of reduced income, the taxpayer with fluctuating income would be
able to mitigate the effects of progressive rates and to reduce his total
tax burden.
To prevent the taxpayer from realizing any economic benefits dur-
ing the period that taxation is postponed, the deposits would be non-
assignable and would normally not be transferable between tax units.10
Depositors would be prohibited from borrowing against the accounts,"
and to discourage speculation on changes in tax rates deposits could not
be withdrawn within twelve months of when they were made.12 There
would be no limitations on the amount which a taxpayer could deposit,
although normally a taxpayer would never deposit more than his cur-
rent taxable income.13
7. 3 REPORT 270-71.
8. Id. 271. Deposits would have to be withdrawn whenever a tax unit was teninated,
e.g., by death, immigration, except at marriage and divorce when the deposits would be
carried over to the new tax unit. The Report suggests that a 30 per cent withholding tax be
imposed at withdrawal. Id. Deposits made within 60 days of the dose of the taxable year
would be deductible from the income of the prior year. Id. 270.
9. Id. 270. The Report shows some confusion. At places it speaks of making tile de.
posits non-negotiable (id. 270, 278), but the tenor of the Report made explicit in other
sections is that the accounts should be non-assignable. Id. 260.
10. Id. 260, 270, 278. Limited transferability would be permitted between tax units
upon marriage or divorce. At marriage the taxpayer would not have to bring the deposits
into taxable income upon termination of his individual tax unit and the formation of a
family unit. Similarly, at divorce or separation the deposits could be transferred without
taxation between the family tax unit and the ensuing individual units.
Transfers within the tax unit are not discussed in the Report. Normally, this would
present no problem as a deposit could be liquidated by one member of a unit and the
proceeds redeposited by another member of the same unit without any tax consequences.
During the initial twelve-month holding period, however, such withdrawals and rede-
posits would be impossible, yet the ability to make changes in ownership within the tax
unit may be important in contexts other than taxation.
This problem can be avoided either by permitting transfer of the accounts between
members of a tax unit or by allowing a member of the tax unit to tack on to his holding
period the holding period of the transferor when both persons involved are members of
the same tax unit and the new deposit is made directly from the proceeds of the former.
11. Id. 260. See pp. 1238-39 infra.
12. 3 REPORT 270.
13. Since the tax saving is the difference between the applicable rate in the year of
deposit and the year of withdrawal, the taxpayer normally could not benefit from reducing
his taxable income below the lowest tax bracket. There would be several exceptions to
this rule. In periods in which the minimum rate is reduced, profits would still be possible.
P. 1241 infra. If the accounts are used in conjunction with block averaging, a tax
payer might wish to have a negative income for certain years in the block averaging period.
In this case his tax savings would be the difference between the marginal rate which lie
would have paid on the income if it were left in the block averaging period and the ap-
plicable rate at withdrawal in a subsequent block averaging period. See pp. 1230l1 infra.
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The apparent simplicity of the accounts makes them immediately
attractive as an averaging method. Neither the government nor the
taxpayer would need to keep extensive records of the taxpayer's pre-
vious returns,14 and verification and control by the government would
be much simpler than under most averaging devices. 1' The taxpayer
would be able to compute his tax liability in the same manner as other
taxpayers and would not need to apply multiple or complex schedules.10
Finally, unlike some averaging schemes, the taxpayer could readily
understand the operation of the accounts, a factor which might con-
tribute both to the taxpayer's compliance and to his feeling of fair
treatment.'
7
The income accounts would benefit two groups of taxpayers.18 The
A tax benefit would also result if a negative tax were adopted for income deficits. Pre-
sumably, people would be prohibited from using the accounts for this purpose.
14. Cf. 3 REPORT 264-65 (block averaging requiring the taxpayer to keep track of his
taxable income, tax credits, and taxes paid for five years); I.X'. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-
05 (requiring taxpayer to keep track of taxable income, capital gains, wagering income,
income from certain gifts and bequests, and taxes paid for five years).
15. Even with the techniques of modem data storage, it may be too expensive for the
government to keep information about the taxpayer's previous returns for extensive periods.
The United States, for example, has chosen to store data in its master file for only three
year intervals. Jack, ADP-An Analysis of its Operation and Results, N.Y.U. 24th I-sr.
ON FED TAx. 99, 100 (1966).
16. Compare W. ViczREY, supra note 2, at 175 (multiple tables for lifetime averaging)
with 3 RPosr 265 (multiple tables for block averaging). For samples of the complex
computations under the present averaging provisions in the United States, see Goldberg,
supra note 1, at 477 n.76, 479 n.79.
17. See Smith, supra note 5, at 25-26. See also H. GRovEs, POSTWAR TAXATION AD
ECONOAUC PROGRESs 226 (1946).
18. The following chart indicates the number of )ears it would be profitable to hold
the accounts, given diffrent personal discount rates and the marginal tax rate in the )*ear
in which income is taxed, assuming that the marginal tax rate in the year of deposit is
50 per cent, the maximum rate under the Commission's proposals.
aDiscount Rate
5% 10% 15% 20%
S 40% 3 1 11
0 30% 6 3 2 1
'j 20% 9 5 3 2
. 10% 12 6 4 3
The appropriate discount rate for an individual may be quite high. It should equal (1)
the cost to him of an unsecured and unrestricted loan plus (2) a premium reflecting his
uncertainty about his future marginal rates. Cf. Bittker, supra note 4. at 959.61. The
value of the accounts to individual taxpayers, and consequently the number of years which
they could be held without loss, would be greater if taxpayers were able to earn income
effectively from the accounts during the period of deposit. See pp. 1238.39 & note 96 infra.
The chart reflects an obvious but important feature of any averaging scheme for income
declines. Because of the increased earning power which results from the bunching of
receipts early in the averaging period, the taxpayer, at some point, will al ays prefer an
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first is taxpayers who receive large non-recurring items of taxable in-
come. Because the Report concluded that income should be measured
comprehensively, it swept both realized capital gains and all major
transfers (including gifts and bequests) within the definition of taxable
income. 9 The income accounts would permit taxpayers whose income
is temporarily increased by these sources to spread the impact over
several years.2
0
The accounts would also aid those taxpayers who can foresee sharp
permanent drops in income-the most important beneficiaries being
those with high incomes and short career lives such as professional
athletes and entertainers. 21 Through the accounts these taxpayers would
be able to spread their income forward into the years when they expect
diminished receipts, an option now only selectively available in both the
United States and Canada.22
Most taxpayers, because they have relatively stable incomes, would
ordinarily not use the accounts. Only at retirement, when incomes tend
to drop sharply, would the accounts be useful for the average wage
earner. Retirement, however, presents far broader concerns than the
income fluctuations which averaging deals with, and the Report treats
retirement as a separate problem.2 3 It suggests the adoption of more
generous although more controlled provisions for retirement savings-4
and tries to inhibit the use of income accounts for retirement pur-
poses.25 Similarly, United States tax law already includes special pro.
visions for retirement income, most notably those which encourage
uneven stream of income with a higher tax burden over a smooth distribution of the
income.
19. 3 REPORT 67-71. See generally id. 325-400, 465-536.
20. Id. 242.
21. For examples of the problems faced by these groups, see Kragen 8, Barton, The Tax
Dilemma of the Entertainer, 31 So. CAL L. REv. 390 (1958); Cohen, Personal Holding
Companies-Entertainment Industry, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX Iu s. 651.
22. See p. 1232 infra; 3 RErORT 244-47, 402-08.
23. See 3 REPORT 401-63.
24. Id. 455-59. Taxpayers would be permitted to make donations of cash and other
property to registered retirement plans, and donations would be deductible from cunent
income until they reached the maximum allowable levels of savings. These plans differ
from the accounts in several ways. They are not governmental deposits, earnings are
attributed to the taxpayer, and the ceiling limits the maximum tax benefits.
25. All deposits in income accounts would have to be withdrawn In the year hi which
the youngest member of a tax unit reached sixty. Id. 272. This was done in part to avoid
the pyramiding of liabilities at death. Whenever a tax unit is terminated by death, there
is a deemed realization of all property gains, and this may produce a high taxable incoine
in that year with high effective rates. In addition, the subsequent taxation of the bequests
to the beneficiaries may give the illusion of "double taxation."
The 60 year rule may have some capricious results, for it would permit those taxpayers
who have young spouses to take advantage of the accounts for retirement purposes while
making this use impossible for taxpayers whose spouses are about as old as they are.
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retirement savings through qualified pension plans.28 Although both
qualified pension plans and income accounts permit the taxpayer to
postpone taxes on contributions until withdrawal, only funds placed in
qualified plans may be invested; this advantage is compounded by the
fact that the investment earnings are also exempt from taxation until
received by the beneficiary. Because of these differences, a taxpayer
may use a qualified pension plan to accumulate savings throughout
his working life but could profitably forego earnings on funds deposited
in income accounts for only a few years before actual retirement.-
Since income accounts would not be an efficient way of generating
retirement savings for most taxpayers, they cannot be considered a
substitute for such measures as qualified pension plans. At retirement
the accounts must be evaluated in terms of their applicability to that
limited group of taxpayers with declining income for whom qualified
plans and other devices are unavailable or inadequate.
Although expanding the averaging opportunities available to tax-
payers with large lump sum receipts or high but declining incomes
may offer some social or administrative benefits,28 the fundamental
justification for extending tax relief to them through the income ac-
counts rests, as it does for most averaging devices, upon notions of
equity. The Report invokes several sorts of equitable considerations in
favor of the income accounts. First, it suggests that some kind of averag-
ing is required because the annual accounting period is thought to be
too short a period, for equity purposes, over which to measure income. -
This proposition is central to most defenses of general averaging,30 but
unhappily the most common notions of equity embodied in the ability-
26. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 401-05. For a review of both the tax and other policy
concerns in this area, see PEi.rEzvT's Cosm,=rr m i ConRo.ATE Pszo.n FUNms, Punuc
POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRALS (1965).
27. See note 18 supra for the maximum periods which different taxpayers could hold
deposits in income accounts profitably. These periods are independent of savings in
qualified pension plans except inasmuch as benefits paid out under qualified plans in-
crease the taxpayer's taxable income after retirement and thereby increaze the applicable
marginal tax rate on withdrawals.
28. See pp. 126-57 infra.
Averaging is sometimes defended as a counter-cyclical tool. If fluctuations in personal
income are closely related to general economic trends, averaging by refunding taxes
during declines, or in the case of the income accounts by encouraging withdrai-als, will
tend to sustain demand and will dampen the downturn. The income accounts vould teem
especially suitable in this regard because they would increase disposable personal income
by the entire amount of withdrawal and not just the amount of tax savings. There is,
however, no reason to believe that the types of income fluctuations which would cause
taxpayers to use the accounts would be related to cyclical economic activity, and in any
case the amounts of money involved would be relatively small in terms of total national
income changes.
29. S REPoRT 241.
30. But see pp. 1233-4 infra.
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to-pay concept do not point unambiguously to any ideal time period
for measuring income.
Equity, whether measured horizontally in terms of the taxes paid by
persons in similar economic positions or vertically in terms of the rela-
tive tax burdens on persons in different economic positions, is com-
monly defined independently of any time horizon.8' In developing
initial principles of vertical and horizontal equity, the Report itself
fails to consider whether its concepts require or even justify a particular
time horizon as appropriate for measuring income.32 Later, when it
does discuss the time horizon problem, the Report only notes that some
intermediate period less than a lifetime seems the most equitable
period for measuring income, making no serious attempt to justify
this conclusion.33
The Report's cursory statements reflect the lack of any agreement
among scholars. Some assert that lifetime averaging is at least theoreti-
cally required. 4 Others suggest the opposite and argue that ability-to-
pay should be related closely to immediate changes in financial capacity
and therefore that the taxpayer should, as perforce he will under an
annual accounting period, be taxed more heavily "when his ship is
in."35 A third approach would try to relate the period for measuring
income to the taxpayer's own time horizon for economic decisions.80
31. See, e.g., Musgrave, supra note 4, at 45.
Musgrave would ideally define income on a lifetime basis, id. 59, but that is not required
by his choice of income as his index for horizontal and vertical equity. See pp. 1228.29,
infra.
32. The Commission followed the ability-to-pay school. Horizontal equity is achieved
when "individuals and families with the same gains in discretionary economic power pay
the same amount of tax." 1 RaroRT 5. Vertical equity results when "individuals and
families pay taxes that are a constant proportion of their discretionary economic
power." Id. For these purposes economic power, income, is measured by the Haig.Slmon
definition, consumption plus accretion. Id. 5-6.
Manipulation of these and other principles leads to the familiar system of progressive
marginal tax rates on total income. Different schedules are provided for families and
unattached individuals, and tax credits are allowed for a few specially recognized specific
non-discretionary expenditures. 3 REPoRT 32-35.
The key relationship explaining the scheme of progression is the assumption that
non-discretionary expenditures-those "necessary to maintain the appropriate standard of
living of the family or unattached individual relative to others"--increase with income but
at a less than proportional rate until income reaches $100,000. 3 REPoRT 8. Recognizing
the subjective nature of its assumption, the Commission puts it forth as one of the
"shared values" which the Commission hopes will "commend themselves to most
Canadians." Id. 5. Needless to say, the relationship provides no information about the
appropriate time horizon for measuring income.
33. 3 RFORT 241.
34. E.g., VicaRE, supra note 2, at 168, 185-86; Musgrave, supra note 4, at 59-60.
35. See R. GooDE, THE INDIvmUAL INcomE TAx 253 (1964).
36. Steger, On the Theoretical Equity of an Averaging Concept for Income Tax
Purposes, 13 TAx L. REv. 211, 224-27 (1958); Slitor, The Flexibility of Income Tax Yield
Under Averaging, 54 J. POL. EcoN. 266, 268 (1946).
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This latter concept lends itself to a number of interpretations. It could
be measured by the period in which most individuals adjust their actual
consumption and savings patterns to changes in incomeY7 or it might
be the period in which expected receipts influence the taxpayer's
present behavior.38 But whatever precise meaning is given to the period,
it is dear that for most individuals, including those with fluctuating
incomes, it is rather short. Existing empirical studies indicate that
averaging under this approach would be justified for intermediate
periods of three to five years, at most.30
The appeal of income accounts, of course, will depend in large part
upon one's view of the appropriate measuring period.40 Obviously, the
accounts would have no place, except for certain ad hoc uses, in a tax
37. The observed period in which changes in measured income are followed by
changes in consumption is rather short although it may depend in part upon the nature
of the receipt. See, Ando & Brown, Lags in Fiscal Policy, in STaLuzATIoN PoICIus 1, 9-10,
111-38 (1963) (86 per cent of the expected change in consumer expenditures may take
place by the end of the third quarter following the change in income); Liviatan, Estimates
of Distributed Lag Consumption Functions from Cross Section Data, 47 Rxv. Eco.v. &
STAT scs 44, 49 (1965) ("combined effect of all past [annual] incomes on current con-
sumption is extremely small compared with the effect of current income'). The rela-
tionship may be asymmetric-a longer period being required for adjustments to declines.
See J. DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING AND THE TiEoRY OF CoNsUiMR Benwior 76"89 (1949);
Suits, The Determinants of Consumer Expenditure: A Review of Present Knowledge, in
COMuISSION ON MONEY AND CREDIT, ImPACTs OF MsONrARY PoLIcY 1, 17 (1963). From the
viewpoint of the income tax, the relationship between changes in income and changes
in consumption would seem the most important. There are, of course, many other factors
which may determine the level of consumption, and current income may not be the most
significant. See generally J. DUESENBERRY, supra; M. FlrEM&A, A TiHEORY OF THE CON-
SU PT ON FuNcrbON (1957); Ando & Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Savings:
Aggregate Implications and Tests, 53 AM. Econ. REv. 56 (1963); Suits, supra at 14-23, at
48-53; H. HOUTHAxEER S. L TAYLOR, CONSUME.R DE AND IN TiE UNrr STATES 1929-1970,
173-94 (1966).
38. This interval is arguably the most relevant because it would describe the individual's
own subjective view of the time dimensions of his income. Friedman in his permanent
income hypothesis uses such a period to calculate the individual's "wealth" and, hence,
permanent income. He estimates that the average period for all persons is about three
years. Friedman, Windfalls, the "Horizon," and Related Concepts in the Permanent-
Income Hypothesis, in IEAs m -r IN EcoNomtcs 1, 7 (1963); M. FmmMA.n, supra note
37, at 137-56, 211.
Testing the Friedman hypothesis has been extremely difficult because of the alternative
interpretations which may be placed upon results derived from measured income and
consumption. Compare H. HouAIo I & L TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 179-82, with Perry,
Consumer Demand in the United States, 57 Am. EcoN. REV. 833, 837-38 (1967). The
estimates which have been made indicate an even shorter horizon than that suggested by
Friedman. E.g., Liviatan, supra note 37, at 49 ('permanent income' is determined almost
completely by current income").
39. See authorities cited notes 36-38 supra.
40. Regardless of what time period is thought ideal for measuring income, the accounts
might be defended as a logical extension of the Report's decision to tax individuals on
their accretions in economic power. I REPORT 4-6. If the accounts neutralize the economic
power which the deposited funds represent, they should arguably be excluded from
income until the taxpayer withdraws the deposits and recognizes their economic potential.
But no one could seriously maintain that the taxpayer holding deposits is in the same
economic position as one who does not, and the accretion theory requires that this dif-
ference be taken into account.
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system premised upon measuring ability to pay by short-run changes
in income. Even if an intermediate or long period offering a greater
role for the accounts is accepted for measuring income, the utility of
income accounts must be evaluated within the context of specific tax
systems. Because the accounts cannot benefit taxpayers who are ex-
periencing steady increases in income or who suffer unexpected income
declines, they must be used in conjunction with other averaging
methods in order to provide complete averaging for fluctuating in-
comes.
To implement its decision that income for the purposes of equity
should be measured over an intermediate period, the Commission rec-
ommended a system of block averaging over five-year intervals as a sup-
plement to the income accounts. 41 Block averaging is relatively simple
and may be used for both upward and downward shifts in income. The
five-year period is capable of providing relief for most fluctuating in-
comes and lump-sum receipts, but block averaging, even as a short-run
device, is somewhat less adequate for permanent income changes
because the amount of tax relief and its timing depend heavily upon
the particular grouping of years used.42 The income accounts would
alleviate some of these peculiarities for those anticipating income drops
41. The taxpayer may average over periods of five or less consecutive years. Except at
death, when a five year period would be allowed regardless of earlier averaging, no year
could be used more than once. The taxpayer would add his taxable income for tle period,
and using special tables which would reflect rate changes during the period, the taxpayer
would calculate the tax he would have paid if his income had been spread evenly through.
out the period. After the deduction of his tax credits, he would compare the tax assessed
on that basis with the amount of tax actuallly paid. lie would be entitled to a refund of
any difference over $50. 3 REPORT 264-65. The Canadian* already have some experience
with this form of averaging. CAN. REv. STAT., ch. 148, § 42 (1952).
42. Under block averaging the amount of savings is independent of the year in which
a lump-sum is received if income is otherwise constant. But if there is a pernanent
change in income, the amount of relief depends upon the year in the block period the
change takes place. The following table indicates the tax savings provided by block
averaging for a couple whose taxable income drops permanently from $60,000 to $10,000
per year.
YEAR oF THE AVERAGING PERIOD
IN WwcH DROP Occuas
1 2 3 4 5
Tax Savings 0 ;3,660 §7,370 $6,580 $3,790
(Table derived from recommended tax schedule for a family with no dependents. a
REPORT 174.)
The timing of relief, particularly when income drops, also has disadvantages. The
refund may be received only a substantial period after the change in income and will be
of little assistance in helping the taxpayer adjust to his new income levels.
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by allowing them to transfer income between block averaging periods,43
and would permit averaging for periods longer than five yearsA4
The United States presently permits averaging of ordinary income's
by allowing the taxpayer, in effect, to spread his income back over the
previous four taxable years.40 Averaging thus is limited to significant
increases in taxable income.47 These provisions are capable of handling
most occasional receipts as well as increments in permanent income.
They do not, however, provide any relief for persons suffering from
income drops,48 and therefore represent an incomplete acceptance of
the theories urging averaging over intermediate periods.40 Because
income accounts also do not provide complete averaging, they should
not seriously be considered as an alternative to the present averaging
provisions.50 But the adoption of the accounts to supplement the cur-
rent provisions would create some symmetry by permitting averaging
for anticipated income decreases. In addition, the accounts would per-
mit some persons to average their income over a longer period. The
taxpayer would, however, still be without averaging privileges when
his income declines unexpectedly.
In assessing the case for adoption of the income accounts it is im-
43. If the taxpayer were allowed to regroup the years used in any averaging block
after seeing his actual income pattern, the variations in relief could be reduced. But this
would require the taxpayer to keep information at hand for as long as nine years and
would mean that prior averaging computations could be reopened for four years after
filing.
44. The income accounts would allow taxpayers to transfer income from one block
averaging period to another, thus increasing the averaging etiod from five to ten years.
If the taxpayer is effectively restrained from receiving earnings on the accounts (see pp.
123743 1Inra), he would make deposis only at the end of one averaging period, carry the
accounts for the minimum holding time of twelve months, and then withdraw them in
the first year of the next block averaging interval. There would be only two exceptions.
The first is when the taxpayer is speculating on changes in tax rates. Speculation is not
possible through block averaging alone because the applicable schedules are adjusted for
rate changes. See p. 1241 infra. The second is when use of the accounts 
within a
block averaging interval would allow the taxpayer to accelerate receipt of the tax reduc-
tion from the end of the period to an earlier y'ear and when the earnings on the tax
savings during the remainder of the block averaging interval would be greater thlan te
loss of earnings on the funds during the period of deposit.
45. Averaging is not permitted for w¢agering income, certain income from gifts and
bequests, and capital gains. lucr. R.EV. CODE of 1954, § 1302(b).46. Id. § 1302(e)(2).
47. Id. § 1301. Because the base period income must be multiplied by 1.33. the reliefis less than what full block averaging over the five year period would provide. Unlike the
Canadian system the income is all taxed at current rates.
48. Minor relief is available for temporary income declines. When his normal incomelevel is restored, the taxpayer may average back over the period of the deline. This pos-
sibility would be enhance nd t relief made more quickly available if averaging periods
shorter than five years could be used.
49. In enacting the provisions, Congress apparently accepted lifetime averaging as
ideal, but felt constrained by administrative considerations to restrict averaging to interd
mediate periods. IN. Rres. No. C749, 8th Cong., 1st Ses. 110 (1984).
50. See p. 1229 supra.
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portant to remember that many taxpayers are already able through a
variety of statutory schemes to adjust the timing of their taxes.51 Be-
cause the income accounts bear no earnings, taxpayers are unlikely to
prefer them when other devices are available to delay taxes. In some
cases, however, availability of the accounts would tend to equalize the
tax burdens of persons in otherwise similar positions who are unable
to take advantage of existing forms of avoidance.52
This is most obvious and important in the case of deferred compen-
sation agreements.5 3 In the typical deferred compensation contract the
employee agrees to be paid in the future for his present services. The
employer on the accrual basis is allowed a current deduction for the
incurred obligation, 4 but the employee using cash-basis accounting is
not required to report his income from the agreement until he is actu-
ally paid.55 This kind of contractual arrangement for forward averaging
would usually be preferred to deposits in income accounts because the
contracting parties do not lose the use of the money involved during
the period that payment is deferred.
Deferred compensation agreements, however, are inferior to for-
ward averaging through income accounts in several respects. The em-
ployee is unable to postpone non-contractual income, and he must de-
cide upon the ideal time for realization at the moment of making the
contract-a decision sometimes made more difficult because the size
of the payments is still contingent."0 More important, the employee
must depend upon the continued solvency of the employer. If the
employee attempts to avoid this risk by collaterally securing or funding
the agreement, the employer may lose his deduction entirely or the
employee may realize income currently.57 As a result of these restric-
tions the present rules governing deferred compensation agreements
favor the employees of established, ongoing businesses.
51. See Bittker, supra note 4, 958-73; Abrams, Income Deferral: Problems, Techniques
and Consequences, N.Y.U. 25m INsr. oF TAX. 577 (1967).
52. But see note 74 infra.
53. See generally Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CUM. BUL. 174; Irell & Stone, Current Dcvel-
opments in Deferred Compensation Arrangements for the Individual Employee, U. So.
CAL. 1961 TAx INST. 325; Rice, The New Tax Policy on Deferred Compensation, 59 Miliil.
L. REv. 381 (1961). Deferred compensation agreements are compared to the qualified
pension plans discussed infra in Friedman, Retirement Planning for Executives, N.Y.U.
24TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 705 (1966).
54. Irell & Stone, supra note 53, at 334-36.
55. Id. 337.
56. The most famous example is William Holden's contract for appearing in "Bridge
on the River Kwai" in which he agreed to receive his share of the gross receipts at
$50,000 a year. The picture was so successful that it would have taken him more than
forty years to receive full payment. See TiME, Jan. 19, 1959, at 66.
57. Irell & Stone, supra note 53, at 330-36; Rice, supra note 53, at 390-92.
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The introduction of the income accounts in the present code would
thus extend to a wider group at least part of the privileges already
available to some through deferred compensation agreements, and
with the accounts available as an alternative means of forward averag-
ing, it would be possible to cut back on the use of deferred compen-
sation agreements by revoking Revenue Ruling 60--1 and using the
cash equivalent and constructive realization doctrines more vigor-
ously.5s This would provide more equitable treatment of taxpayers
who wish to avail themselves of fonward averaging because it would
permit the inclusion of non-contractual income and would eliminate
distinctions flowing solely from the financial status of the employer.
Quite apart from notions of general averaging, the Report suggests
that the accounts may be justified as an ad hoc compensatory device
for other distortions in the tax system.69 Even if the annual period is
accepted as ideal, other considerations, notably the need for liquidity
and the difficulties of valuation, may require the realization in a single
accounting period of gains accrued over a period of years. The most
common example, of course, is the taxation upon realization of accrued
gains on property. This problem was particularly important to the
Royal Commission because of its decision to tax capital gains as ordi-
nary income, but the same considerations also apply to slowly maturing
earned income.
The Report would use the income accounts as an alternative to
preferential taxation of these gains, permitting the taxpayer to spread
out the income received from disposition of an appreciated asset or
for services rendered over several years. But the income accounts are
not the most suitable averaging device for this purpose. Tax savings
obtained by the use of the accounts will bear no relation to the time
pattern of the income during accrual, yet this is the period which is
logically relevant for determining the appropriate tax burden. Because
they at least look backward toward the time of accrual, albeit impre-
cisely, both the present United States averaging provisions and, to a
lesser extent, block averaging would be preferable to the income ac-
counts as devices for granting tax relief when major gains are realized.co
From the taxpayer's point of view, the five-year spreading avail-
58. See Irell & Stone, supra note 53, at 327-33; Rice. supra note 53, at 383-89. See aho
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1964).
59. 3 Ra r 242.
60. See pp. 1229-31 supra. Because of the advantages of postponing taxes until realiza-
tion, complete parity of tax burden need not be achieved. See Bittker, sumpa note 4. at
959.
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able from either block averaging or existing American law would not
necessarily be inferior to that available through the income accounts
because of the substantial loss of earnings which would result from
holding deposits in the accounts over long periods.01
When income can be valued and allocated to particular years, the
best solution from the point of view of equity is not averaging at all,
but annual revaluation. 2 This approach avoids the bunching of income
but does not permit the taxpayer to take advantage of postponement.
The Report recognized this and suggested that optional revaluation be
permitted for either gains or losses.0 '
The final equity argument made by the Commission in favor of the
accounts is that they would help dampen the impact of progressive tax
rates on lump-sum transfers.04 Since the Commission recommended
integrating the estate and gift tax into the income tax, its proposals
would substantially increase the effective rates of tax on those transfers
when made to persons outside the family or between generations.08
The income accounts would allow the recipient to spread the income
over any desired period in order to reduce the impact of these changes.
There is nothing in the other equity principles adopted by the
Commission to justify this concession. 8 Indeed, use of the accounts to
offset the increase in taxes on gifts and bequests caused by the shift to
a comprehensive income base would favor property income 1 at the
cost of the Commission's conceptions of equity and thereby push the
system away from the ideal distribution of burdens which the Report
postulates.0 8 The real reason for the Commission's suggestion was
61. See note 18 for examples of maximum profitable holding periods.
62. See Musgrave, supra note 4, at 49.
63. 3 REPORT 366-68. In the United States wash sales may be used to recognize gains
but not losses. Ir. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 1091. For a proposal to value and tax certain
capital gains annually, see Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of
Publicly Held Stock, 7P YALE L.J. 623 (1967).
64. 3 REPORT 242.
65. 3 REPORT 504-07. In evaluating these changes it is important to realize that gifts
and bequests would only be taxed when made outside of the family tax unit. In general
this would mean that there would be no tax when an estate passed to a surviving spouse
but that gifts and inheritances would be fully taxed when they passed to adult childreil
or others not within the immediate family. In effect, taxation to the family is limited to
inter-generational transfers.
66. See note 32 supra. Arguably, gifts and inheritances should be taxed more heavily
because they represent totally discretionary income.
67. Gifts and bequests are derived primarily from property income. Cf. R. BARLOW,
H. BRAZER & J. MORGAN, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF THE AFFLUENT 87-93 (1%7).
68. The Commission's recommended schedule of rates deviates only slightly from Its
"ideal" schedule. 3 RErPORT 166. The calculations, however, do not take into account the
value of postponement, which would significantly reduce the effective tax on property
appreciation, and the income accounts would further decrease the taxation of capital,
Of course, the total effect of the recommendations of the Commission would have been
1234
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probably to mute some of the criticism which would inevitably ac-
company a sharp increase in taxes on lump transfers. It may also have
been a response to the more favorable treatment of bequest and gift
income in the United States, 9 a comparison to which the Report was
sensitive throughout.70
In the United States, of course, the transfer problem does not exist
because of the exclusion of gifts and bequests from taxable income.7
The accounts could be considered, however, as a useful adjunct of any
integration of the gift and estate taxes into the income tax.7- They
would satisfy one of the objections to such a reform-the high rate of
tax resulting from the bunching of the receipts in a single year. From
the viewpoint of ability to pay, integration and the accounts would
also be superior to a separate accessions tax, a commonly-suggested al-
ternative technique of taxing transfers to the donee.73 Accessions tax
rates do not take into account the taxpayer's other income, and equal
transfers result in the same tax burdens on high- and low-income tax-
payers.7
4
In its defense of the accounts the Commission was primarily con-
cerned with equalizing the tax burdens of persons in similar positions. "
But even if the accounts do promote horizontal equity, the gains must
also be weighed against the impact the accounts would have on ver-
to increase the taxation of investment income-no doubt an important factor in their
demise. In this sense the Report as a whole is an improvement over the preeant Canadian
system when judged by the Report's own principles.
69. Compare C. SHOUP, FEDERAL EsTATE &- GiFr TAxEs 80 (1906) (effective estate tax
rates in the United States) with 3 REPORT 174 (income tax rates for married couple ap-
plicable to bequests included within income). Any comparison of rates will understate the
difference because of the availability in the United States of special avoidance devices
under the estate tax, eg., generation-skipping trusts, or disposition through the gift tax
with lower effective rates and a high exclusion.
70. E.g., 3 REPORT 158-63, 619-32; 6 id. 81-82. The entire corporate tax structure Is
keyed to the levels of corporate taxation in the United States. 4 id. 5-6. This is probably
inevitable because of the nearly integrated capital market existing between the United
States and Canada.
71. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 102.
72. A revision of the gift and estate taxes in this way, however, seems highly unlikely.
Current reform proposals are directed towards either unifying the present gift and estate
taxes while keeping them separate from the income tax or substituting in their place an
accessions tax. See Casner, American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project,
22 TAx L. REv. 515 (1967); Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: The Major
Issues Presented in the American Law Institute Project, 22 TAx L. REv. 635 (1967);
Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAx L. REv. 569 (1967). At least in theory it
would not necessarily be inequitable to have a transfer tax as well as an income tax on
gifts and bequests. See B. BrrrEER, FEDERAL INcossa, ESr.TE AND Girr TAXATIOx 998 (3d
ed. 1964).
73. See Andrews, supra note 72.
74. But see Rudick, What Alternative to the Estate and Gift Taxes? 38 CAuF. L. REv.
150, 175 (1950).
75. 3 REPORT 241.
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tical equity. The availability of income accounts would tend to reduce
the progressivity of any tax structure. The benefits of averaging are
only significant for those who are in the higher income brackets during
at least part of their lifetime,7 6 and only affluent taxpayers could afford
to hold large deposits relative to their income.7
The benefits from the limited averaging already available in the
United States, although small, are highly regressive in their distribu-
tion. 78 Introduction of the income accounts might marginally spread
the benefits of averaging over a wider group, possibly increasing hori-
zontal equity; the incidence on the system as a whole, however, would
further reduce progressivity. Certainly, there is no consensus about
precisely what constitutes vertical equity,79 but given the already low
effective rates on high income, comprehensively measured,80 the argu-
ment for further reductions seems weak in a tax system which pretends
to be progressive. In the absence of other compensatory changes, the
deposits would undoubtedly increase the discrepancies between effec-
tive rates and the rate structure commonly espoused by the advocates
of a comprehensive tax base.8'
Aside from equity the Report suggests that the accounts would be a
useful addition to the tax system because they would reduce the amount
76. Seventy per cent of Canadian taxpayers have incomes less than $5,000 and would
pay taxes at an effective rate of 7 per cent or less under the Commission's proposals.
See 6 REPORT 57-58.
77. See, e.g., R. LAMPMAN, THE SHARE OF Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEAurn
1922-56, at 23-24 (1902) (26 per cent of personal sector wealth held by top one per cent of
adults in 1956); Friend & Schor, Who Saves? in 2 CONSUMrToN AND SAVING 223 (I. Friend
& R. Jones eds. 1960) (the highest tenth of spending units possess between 73 per cent and
125 per cent of the net savings for all spending units).
78. See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PRELLMINARY REPORT, STATISTICS or INcoMI-
1965, INDIVIDUAL INcOME TAX RETURNS, U.S. Treasury Dep't Pub. No. 198, at 5 (1967).
Less than 10 per cent of the savings from income averaging was realized by taxpayers
having adjusted gross incomes of under $20,000, yet these taxpayers comprised more thlan
97 per cent of all taxpayers filing returns. Id. 5, 17. This comparison exaggerates the total
effect because the taxpayers using averaging necessarily had lower AGI's in prior years, but
the overall impact of averaging is clear.
79. See Bittker, supra note 4, at 980-85; H. SIMsONS, supra note 4, at 17-19. See generally
H. KALVEN & W. BLUM, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1954).
80. Recent estimates of the effective tax rates on total income (adjusted gross income
plus excluded capital gains, tax-exempt interest, imputed rent, and social security benefits)
show effective tax rates in the United States rising to a maximum of 27.80 per cent in the
100-500 thousand dollar bracket and then dropping to 25.46 per cent for incomes above
that level. B. OKNER, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 75 (1966). Even
these figures would overestimate liability for the highest income groups if (1) ad-
justments were made for the advantages from postponement until realization of taxes on
accrued property gains, (2) gifts and bequests were included in gross income, and (3) per-
centage depletion deductions used in calculating gross income were reduced by the excess
of such deductions over those available from cost depletion. All of these changes would
seem required by a more thorough application of the accretion notion of income. See gen-
erally authorities cited note 4 supra.
81. See, e.g., B. OKNER, supra note 80, at 77-81; Pechman, What Would a Comprehen-
sive Individual Income Tax Yield? in 1959 COMPENDIUM 251, 279-80.
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of litigation between the tax authorities and the taxpayer about the
timing of receipts.8  This may be so in some cases, but whenever size-
able sums are involved the taxpayer will still have considerable in-
centive to manipulate his income so that he can receive the tax benefits
of postponement without having to bear the loss of earnings on the
income which would result from placing it in an income adjustment
account.8 3 The accounts would decrease the need for year-end manip-
ulation by cash-basis taxpayers,8 4 but because of the minimum twelve-
month holding period for deposits the taxpayer may prefer to adjust
the timing of receipts rather than use the deposits.
Finally, against whatever savings in litigation of this type might
result must be offset the costs of policing the accounts. These costs may
be much greater than the Commission recognized. Even if the accounts
are thought to be a desirable addition to the tax code, there are a
number of practical difficulties in their implementation. One group of
problems arises from the need to restrain the taxpayer from enjoying
before withdrawal the economic power which the deposits represent.85
It was for this reason that the Report suggested that no interest be
paid on the accounts and that the restrictions be imposed on trans-
ferability and borrowing.8 0 But neutralization of the accounts may be
nearly impossible. For instance, the prohibition on assignment may
be avoided by making a contract for payment out of the proceeds of
the deposits after withdrawal and payment of withholding taxes.
8s
82. 3 REPORT 241. Tax avoidance has been of even more concern in Canada than in
the United States because of the rather narrow construction courts have given tax statutes,
and as a consequence, broad delegation of discretionary powers is given the Minister of
National Revenue to set aside acts in avoidance of tax. See generally 3 RrPOR 537-75.
83. Unfortunately under almost any conceivable form of averaging, timing is still
going to make a difference, and taxpayers will take that difference into account m order-
ing their affairs. Cf. Bittker, supra note 4, at 958-61; Bittker, An Optional Simplified
Income Tax? 21 TAx L. Rxv. 1, 9 (1965).
84. By delaying actual receipt so that it falls in the following accounting period, the
taxpayer is able to postpone taxation one year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (1957). See also
Hahn, Methods of Accounting: Their Role in the Federal Income Tax Law, 1960 WAsu.
U.L.Q. 1, 44-48.
85. This is necessary for several reasons. First, under the equity principles adopted by
the Commission, the deposit holder should bear the same tax burden as a person having
a smooth income pattern only if he is put in the same position, i.e., if be is restrained
from enjoying the economic power which the deposits represent until he takes them into
income. 3 REPORT 259. More fundamentally, if the taxpayer were permitted to earn income
on the accounts, savings would be effectively exempted from taxation, and the whole basis
of the income tax would be shifted from income to consumption.
86. See p. 1224 supra.
87. See Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567 (1886);
Grossman v. Schlosser, 19 App. Div. 2d 813, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1963) (following "with re-
luctance" Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882): assignment of the proceeds of any
settlement or judgment resulting from a personal injury claim valid and enforceable even
though assignment of the claim is prohibited); 4 A. CoRBm, Com-crs § 877 (1951). See
also 1 G. GmLmoE, S.cuarry IsNrERrs iN PERSONAL PROPRTY §§ 7.6-7.9 (1965).
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Even if the prohibition on transfer is made effective, the deposits
represent resources which creditors should be able to reach either
through attachment or levy88 or in bankruptcy proceedings.8 0 The ac-
counts are clearly the property of the taxpayer and except for the
minimum twelve-month holding period they can be reduced immedi-
ately to cash by the simple expedient of withdrawal. Prohibition of
attachment and levy by judgment creditors or seizure by the trustee
in bankruptcy would effectively allow the debtor an unlimited exemp-
tion for cash holdings,9 0 a radical departure from the present limited
exemptions allowed by statutef 1
These difficulties will not be as important if the prohibition on
borrowing can be made effective. But this too may be difficult. Banks
and other credit agencies could be barred from lending against the
security of the accounts62 either directly or indirectly;03 this could
The federal anti-assignment statute, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964), would offer no additional
protection. See, e.g., Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); Martin v. National Surety
Co., 300 U.S. 588, 594-95 (1937); Lay v. Lay, 248 U.S. 24 (1918); United States V. Shannon,
186 F.2d 430, 432-33 (4th Cir. 1951); Note, Unassignable Claims Against the United States:
A Commercial Anachronism, 68 YA=E L.J. 515, 516 (1959),
88. Cf. Guldager v. United States, 204 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1953) (saving bonds although
not transferable may be attached by judgment creditors); 31 C.F.R. § 315.21(a) (1966)
(savings bond may be paid to authorized officer in satisfaction of money judgment).
89. Cf. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966) (tax refund from loss carryover passes
to trustee in bankruptcy evet though refunds are not assignable); In re Goodson, 208 Vt.
Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (prorated portion of tax refund on withheld wages pases to
trustee); 31 C.F.R. § 315.21(b) (1966) (savings bonds pass to trustee in bankruptcy).
90. Only cash may be deposited in the accounts. 3 REPORT 273. An attempt to reduce
property to cash so that it could be deposited might be set aside as fraudulent. The mere
conversion of property from non-exempt to exempt forms, however, does not constitute
fraud. Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943); Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1965).
See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.11, at 853-54 (14th ed. 1967).
91. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964); see 1 Cotw ON BANKRUt TCY 6.13..18,
at 861-92 (14th ed. 1967).
In the absence of modifying legislation, the trustee should ordinarily be able to exercise
the power of withdrawal under § 70(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act vesting in the trustee
"powers which [the bankrupt] might have exercised for his benefit." 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5)
(1964). The more difficult case arises during the minimum holding period when the bank.
rupt himself would have no power to withdraw the deposit. The accounts would be prop.
erty within § 70(a)(5), but they would pass to the trustee only if they could be levied upon
under state law or be "by any means ... transferred." 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1964). The
closest analogy is the loss carryback tax refund which, after a division between the circuits,
the Supreme Court recently held passes to the trustee. Segal v. Roclle, 382 U.S. 375
(1966). See 4A CoLLE ON B, muurcv 70.28. at 398-405 (14th ed. 1967); 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 275, 275-81 (1962).
92. Cf. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1967) (Regulation T of the Federal Reserve limiting the
amount of credit on securities accounts which brokers and dealers may extend); 12 CF.R.
§§ 221.1-.4 (1967) (Regulation U, limiting the amount of credit which banks may extend
for the purchase of securities when the credit is secured directly or indirectly by stock);
31 C.F.R. § 315.15 (1967) (savings bonds may not be "hypothecated, pledged as collateral
or used as security ... 2).
Administration of any prohibition would be simpler than administration of Regulations
T and U in as much as the only test would be a "collateral" one without the need for a
"purpose" test. See generally McEvoy, Bank Loans and Regulation U, 84 IIANtING L.J.
668 (1967).
93. Cf. 12 C.FR. § 221.113 (1967) (loan to a mutual fund which agreed to leave hi the
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supplement the anti-assignment rule and prevent the more obvious
circumventions of those provisions. But unsecured creditors will prob-
ably be willing to lend more money or to charge less interest to persons
with substantial deposits than to persons not holding accounts.04 Con-
sumer credit should be more readily available to a taxpayer with large
deposits; the same is true for unincorporated businessmen wishing
credit on open accounts. Even if the taxpayer does not receive additional
credit, he will be able to undertake activities which he could not other-
wise risk because of the security and additional liquidity which the
funds provide.
Cash-basis accounting provides another means of reducing the cost
of holding non-interest-bearing deposits. The taxpayer may be able to
cut such costs in half by manipulating the timing of his deposits and
withdrawals. By depositing income at the dose of his taxable year or
within 60 days afterwards, and subsequently withdrawing the deposits
just after the expiration of the twelve-month minimum holding period,
the taxpayer could postpone his taxes for two years while foregoing
the use of the income for only a single year.9 r A variant of this procedure
would allow the taxpayer to enjoy earnings on the income every other
year without ever paying tax on it. In theory, the profitability of such
maneuvers could be limited by adjusting the withholding tax at with-
drawal. 96 A completely effective flat rate, however, would have to be
custody of the bank its stock portfolio having a certain percentage value of the loan and
which agreed not to pledge or othenvise encumber the portfolio was a loan "indirectl)"
secured within the meaning of Regulation U).
94. A bank could lend money to the taxpayer in an unsecured transaction and still
protect itself as a general creditor by requiring the taxpayer to covenant that he would
not enter into any other unsecured credit arrangement and having the taxpayer leave
his accounts in the custody of the bank or a third party. See generally 2 G. Gu.M.oR,
supra note 87, § 38.3. A bank would not need an explicit negative pledge dause, as
the taxpayer would presumably be prohibited by the tax law from transferring or pledg-in the deposits.
15. For example, a taxpayer could make a deposit in January 1966, deducting it from
his taxable income for 1965. Upon withdrawal in January 1967 the deposit would become
part of his income for the 1967 calendar year, and he would not have to pay taxes on the
deposit, except for withholding, until 1968. He would thus be able to postpone his tax li-
ability from 1966 to 1968 but would have lost the use of the money for only twelve months.
The after-tax cost of using the accounts in this way at the dose of the taxable year in
which the withdrawal is made would be
r2(1-t)3 + 2r(l-t)2 - (l-w) r (1-t)
where w is the rate of withholding, r is the marginal rate of return on investments held
by the taxpayer, and t is the taxpayer's marginal tax bracket. Since the first term of the
formula is relatively insignificant, the taxpayer is essentially foregoing one year's earnings
on his after-tax income but is gaining one year's earnings on the difference between his
marginal tax rate and the withholding rate. An analogous situation used to exist under
the partnership provisions when the taxable year of the partners differed from the taxable
year of the partnership. See B. BriTTEE, supra note 72, at 748 (1964).
96. The Commission suggests a withholding rate of 30 per cent. 3 REor 271.
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set at the maximum marginal rate, penalizing individuals in lower
brackets by denying them use of the excess amount withheld until the
end of the tax year. Nor would it be simple to individualize withhold-
ing rates. Using income prior to the deposit deduction as a guide°7
would usually overstate liability because persons holding the accounts
will naturally tend to have declining incomes. Another approach would
be to attribute withdrawals made early in the taxable year to the prior
year's income in the same way that the Code formerly tried to cope
with "Dean" trusts, 8 but this would further decrease the flexibility of
the accounts and their availability for intended uses.
It is important to estimate accurately the ability of account holders
to borrow on the strength of accounts or to manipulate the timing of
deposits, for if this power is significant, it will reduce sharply the op-
portunity costs of holding the non-interest-bearing deposits." Indeed,
if the power is sufficiently great, there may be cases in which a taxpayer
without fluctuating income would still find it profitable to make de-
posits.100 Yet it is the lack of earnings which is relied upon to limit use
for purposes other than averaging.
97. Cf. INT. REv. Code of 1954, § 6654 (d)(1) (requirement to pay estimated tax limited
by prior year's income).
98. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(d), 56 Stat. 810 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 663(b)).
In 1954 a five-year throwback rule was adopted to provide further protection. See S. Rut.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1954).
99. The cost to the taxpayer of using the accounts is equal to his after-t,. return on
the difference between what he could earn on his after-tax income and his net return
on the amount which he can borrow while holding the deposits. This may be represented
algebraically as
(1) (1-t) [r (1-t) - b (r-i)] r,>!
where r and t are used as in note 95, supra, i equals the marginal cost of borrowing If
the taxpayer holds the income in deposits, and b equals the proportion of the deposits
which the taxpayer is able to borrow.
When the taxpayer is unable to borrow on the strength of the deposits or when the
rate of return on his investment is less than the rate at which he must borrow, the cost of
holding deposits becomes
(2) (1-t) r (1-t) =- (1-t)2 r
If earnings on investments are not effectively taxed because of postponement until
realization, these formulas become
(11) r 0l-t) - b (r-i) r >, i
and(2') r 0-t).
100. This can occur only if the net benefit from borrowing is greater than the amount
of earnings on the after-tax income. Although this would not normally be the case, It
may result when marginal tax rates are high, the proportion which the taxpayer can
borrow is large, and the spread between the borrowing rate and the rate of return is sig
nificant. For example, if the taxpayer's marginal rate is 70 per cent and he is able to
borrow 70 per cent of the amount of his deposits (the percentage which he could realize
after withholding under the Commission's proposals) and the cost of borrowing werc 8
per cent, the taxpayer would find the accounts profitable whenever he could earn more
than 14 per cent on his investment. He would need to earn only 10.5 per cent if le could
borrow for 6 per cent; he would have to earn 17.5 per cent if the cost of borrowing were
10 per cent.
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Even were one to succeed in neutralizing the accounts, a second seri-
ous abuse is possible. The accounts may be used for speculation on
changes in tax rates.""' In order to avoid complex sets of schedules and
the need to retain tax information over long periods, the deposits must
be taxed in the year of withdrawal without regard to the rates existing
at the time of deposit. 0 2 To dampen speculation the Commission sug-
gested that withdrawals be prohibited for twelve months after de-
posit.103 Although this would increase the cost of speculation, tie at-
tractiveness of speculation depends upon a number of factors, and
profits would still be possible even if the taxpayer's income does not
fluctuate.
Without borrowing or timing manipulation, account-holding tax-
payers could have realized sizable profits from the 1964 and 1965 tax
reductions in the United States. 04 Moreover, in both cases the taxpayer
would have had to take almost no risk because the tax decrease was
announced within 60 days of the close of the 1963 taxable year,'0 " the
period the Report would have allowed for depositing 1963 income.
How frequently such opportunities arise will depend upon how often
rate or other changes affecting the computation of taxable income oc-
cur. 06 Although there have been rate changes in the United States in
only two years since 1954,107 rates were altered 25 times between the
inception of the income tax in 1913 and 1954,08 and if the income tax
is used more actively in the future as a tool for economic stabilization,
rate changes may again become more frequent. 00
If rates go up, depositors should not be allowed to escape the con-
sequences. But the taxpayer may be able to avoid paying the higher
rates by liquidating after the new rates are enacted but before they
101. See 3 REPoRT 270-71.
Speculation in the absence of borrowing effects or the manipulation of tax.'able years,
is profitable when formula (2). supra note 99, results in a figure less than the change in
marginal tax rates.
102. See p. 1225 supra.
103. 3 REPoRT 270.
104. Revenue Act of 1964, § II1; INr. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1.
105. The act was adopted on Feb. 26, 1964. 1 1964 U.S. COonE Co.o. & An. Nnws 22;
2 id. 4356.
106. Any amendments affecting the computation of taxable income are equivalent to
rate changes if they place the taxpayer in a lower tax bracket. Cf. lBittker, An Optional
Simplified Tax? 21 TAx L. REv. 1, 9 (1965).
107. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
108. U.S. BuREAu OF T CENsus, HisroRicAL STATisncs OF TnE UNIrn STATEs, Coo-
NrAr Tnrs To 1957, at 716 (1960).
109. See, e.g., the Swedish structure in which adjustments to the base rate are made
annually without the necessity of reopening the entire statute. WoRM TAX SEruEs,
TAXATION m SWEDEN 77 (1959). See also R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INcosn TA-X 301-07
(1964).
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take effect or by holding through the period of high rates. Unlike more
specialized taxes such as the interest equalization tax,110 it would not be
feasible to prevent this by making any income tax increase retroactive
to the time of original submission. To alter the timing of such major
tax changes only to prevent abuse by account holders would be sense-
less."' To adopt special rules for holders of the accounts would require
the very administrative complexity which the accounts are designed to
avoid.1 3
2
Holding through the period of high rates would be desired by the
government and an attractive gamble for taxpayers when a temporary
surcharge is used to dampen cyclical economic peaks. It could backfire,
however, when, as in so many cases, temporary surcharges become
permanent. The result might be political pressure from account-
holders. In fact, whenever there is a tax increase deposit-holding
taxpayers will seek exemption from the increase on the ground that
the income was received in earlier periods." 3 These pressures would
probably be even more severe when inflation, a normal accompaniment
of the need for rate increases, reduces the real value of the accounts.114
To suggest that such losses were part of the risks accepted when the
deposits were made may be a rational answer, but it will predictably
fail to satisfy account holders.
Both the likelihood of speculation and the incentive to evade efforts
to neutralize the accounts depend upon the level of tax rates." 6 If the
alternative to tax postponement through deposits is low preferential
taxation, such as capital gains treatment in the United States, specula-
tion would rarely be profitable unless a very substantial change in rates
is expected. If the taxpayer cannot otherwise avoid high marginal
110. See S. REP. No. 1267, 88th Cong,. 2d Sess. 9, 23 (1964) (interest equalization tax
made retroactive to the day following the announcement of the President that hu would
seek legislation).
111. The gestation period of income tax increases may be extremely long, Preddent
Kennedy requested a tax reduction on January 24, 1963 as his highest priority legislation,
The reduction did not become law until 13 months later on February 26, 1964. 22 Coo,
Q. 387 (1964). The problems from under-withholding for such a period are just one ex-
ample of the difficulties which retroactivity would create.
112. See p. 1225 supra.
113. Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c)(3)(B) (exemption from tax of distributions
paid out of earnings accrued before March 1, 1913).
114. Price changes are a cost in holding the accounts, but they will usually hfluence
the taxpayer through their effect on the rates of return offered by alternative investments.
The income tax system does not elsewhere recognize income transfers caused by price
fluctuations, and there is no reason why the accounts should be an exception. Se R.
MUsGRAvE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168-69 (1959).
115. This is readily apparent from the formulas, supra note 99, expressing the cost of
holding the accounts. As the rate of tax, t, becomes smaller, the holding costs always be-
come larger.
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rates,116 however, speculation would be more attractive. For a person
paying taxes at the maximum marginal rate proposed by the Report, 50
per cent, a deposit held for one year would be as profitable as an
investment with a ten per cent before-tax return if the tax rate were
decreased by less than three percentage points.117 When marginal tax
rates are higher, as in the United States, extremely small decreases in
tax rates would make speculation profitable.
18
The limited usefulness of the income adjustment accounts in either
the proposed Canadian system or the present United States code must
be balanced against these substantial dangers. Since other methods of
averaging are available for short-run periods,"19 there seems little justi-
fication for adopting a program of income accounts unless a stronger
case is made for long-term averaging. On the other hand, if long-term
averaging is felt to be that important, the adoption of more complex
but more controlled methods, available to all taxpayers, should be
considered.120
116. A taxpayer could well have a high marginal rate for ordinary income while hav-
ing a low effective rate. Slightly less than half of the taxable income of all taxpayers
having adjusted gross incomes over $100,000 in the United States was taxed at capital
gains rates in 1965. The other half of their income was taxed at ordinary rates. See STA-
TISrIcs oF Ixcosim, supra note 78, at 17-18. The high marginal rates on ordinary income
would make speculation attractive to these taxpayers unless their alternative investments
would yield returns in the form of capital gains.
117. Speculation in the absence of borrowing effects or manipulation of taxable years
is profitable when the result of formula (2), supra note 99, is less than the change in
marginal tax rates.
118. At the present maximum marginal rate in the United States, 70 per cent, a rate
change of less than 1.3 per cent would be equivalent to a before tax investment )ielding
10 per cent, and a change in the maximum rate of only three percentage points, from
70 per cent to 67 per cent, would be equivalent to a 10 per cent after tax return for
persons in the highest marginal tax brackets.
119. See, e.g., pp. 1230-31 supra; 3 RrPoRT 256-58.
120. See W. Vicam, supra note 4, at 172-95.
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